IV.
The doctrine of the rectification of names is present in a
germinal state in the Analects. When
Confucius is asked what should be the first priority of the sovereign, he
replies, “Without question it would be to insure that names are used properly [必也正名乎]” (13.3). Here and in Confucius’s own analysis that
follows, the care of language (as the exclusive prerogative of the state) is
explicitly linked to social order. Xunzi will later systematize the
rectification of names into a fully functioning etiology and cosmology:
Nowadays, the sage-kings have passed away, and the preservation of these names has become lax. Strange words have arisen, the names and their corresponding objects are disordered, and the forms of right and wrong are unclear. As a result, even officers who diligently preserve the proper models and scholars who diligently recite the proper order for things are also all thrown into chaos. If there arose a true king, he would surely follow the old names in some cases and create new names in other cases. Thus, one must examine the reason for having names, the proper means for distinguishing like and unlike, and the essential points in establishing names.[i]
In
this formulation, the emphasis switches from the knowledge and care of correct
names, which has already been explicitly tied to the state and ruler in the Analects, to the act and privilege of
naming itself, now envisioned by
Xunzi as the originary function of sovereign power. This means that through the
Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names, “the animal,” because it
remains unconstructed ontologically, is poised to become a kind of lacuna from
which the construction of sovereign power is achieved through a systematized epistemology
of relation.[ii]
Though Mengzi is less rigorous in argumentation than Xunzi,
he often addresses the same or similar themes and topics in his collection. In
one passage which is sometimes referenced in support of the ethical treatment
of animals,[iii]
Mengzi speaks with a king who saves an ox from slaughter by substituting a
sheep for a particular ritual, having accidently seen the ox on the way to
sacrifice and feeling compassion for it. While the king’s subjects misinterpret
this action as “stingy,” Mengzi correctly deduces the deeper meaning behind the
act and addresses the ruler candidly: “As for the relation of gentlemen [君子] to birds and beasts, if
they see them living, they cannot bear to see them die. If they hear their
cries, they cannot bear to eat their flesh. Hence, gentlemen keep their
distance from the kitchen” (Mengzi
1A7).
Bai Tongdong summarizes what he takes to be the lesson of
this passage: “For the Confucian, human beings should be compassionate about
animals not because animals can reason or converse, not because they can
suffer, and not because they treat each other humanely, but rather because we
human beings perceive their sufferings….”[iv]
While I generally agree with Bai’s surface reading, I would add that the
passage also reveals a circular movement within Mengzi’s ethics that demands
closer attention: The paradox is that the king’s “humanity” toward animals
proves his innate humaneness (“humanity” is dependent on human-animal
relation), yet humaneness must be afforded first to human beings rather than
animals (“humanity” is only properly activated through human-human relation).
In addition, the same methodology that connects language to reality, which by
Mengzi’s time would have been codified, is again at play, for it is, after all,
the “gentleman,” the junzi, to whom
this statement exclusively applies; “humaneness” as such is only possessed by
those within the proper social category (the implication being that whoever
works in the kitchen or slaughter house is not a “gentleman” and is therefore
exempt from any feeling of ethical responsibility toward the animal).
[i] Xunzi, trans. by Eric L. Hutton, in Readings in Chinese Philosophy, 293.
[ii]
For a concrete discussion of this process, see the second chapter of Sterckx,
“Animals and Officers,” 45-68.
[iii]
See, for instance, Bai Tongdong, “The Price of Serving Meat—On Confucius’s and
Mencius’s Views of Human and Animal Rights,” Asian Philosophy 19.1 (2009).
[iv]
Ibid., 94.
