May 23, 2012

Some further reflections on Caputo’s On Religion


The guiding question of Caputo’s book, “What do I love when I love my God,” is complicated for several reasons, the least of which is not Caputo’s insistence that religious truth is a kind of “truth without knowledge” (111); in other words, the entire concept of a final, definite answer based on a concrete set of propositions and/or suppositions needs to be qualified.

“God,” it turns out, is approachable from many (one might even say infinite) perspectives (112), and, from the de-capitalized postmodern perspective, no one method of approach can be considered “Really Real” (126). Therefore, just as Derrida argued that “justice” is not deconstructable, Caputo, who himself equates God with justice (138), argues that what we call “God” or “the love of God” is not deconstructable (113). To put it differently, Caputo’s question is, at his own insistence, impossible to answer as it is phrased. Caputo would rather see the interrogative pronoun shift from “What” to “How” (134), which would allow “justice” to become a verb rather than a noun, and “God” to become another word for an enacted responsibility toward others rather than a misunderstood artifact of religious belief.

As Caputo writes, “We do not know who we are…and that is who we are” (128). Following this statement, Caputo’s answer to the question that haunts and guides his entire book seems to be, “We do not know what we love when we love our God, and that is what we love.”

However, this radical unknowability necessarily places Caputo and his postmodern faith at odds with fundamentalism. For Caputo, the various global fundamentalist movements (Protestant, Catholic, Islamic, etc.) are paradoxical reactions to a radically decentered, technologized world. Fundamentalist movements utilize the very technologies and apparatuses of media(tion) that they condemn in order to sustain their ideologies and disseminate their messages; therefore, Caputo argues, it is inevitable that fundamentalisms meet some sort of “explosive” end (106). The faith of the postmodern subject, meanwhile, presents itself vaguely as a “truth without Knowledge” (115) that takes as its starting point the undecidability of metaphysical questions and consequently revels in the hyper-reality of not knowing who one is or (in) what one believes (127).

Through Caputo’s writing style is, as always, engaging, I find that Caputo’s a/theological analysis confuses the real issue here. Caputo’s analysis might have been more relevant and clear had he situated both the various fundamentalisms and postmodernisms as symptoms of the socio-economic processes of late capitalism, as many Marxist scholars have done. Though Caputo would likely shrug this suggestion off as resorting uncritically to a base/superstructure metanarrative, it is clear without reference to any sort of historical teleology that world capitalism represents the fundamental problem faced by the contemporary ethical subject.

The way Caputo constructs the two phenomena reveals that, in a way, fundamentalism and postmodernism are not altogether distinct since they both respond directly to “the abyss within” (108). It is ironic, then, that Caputo, for whom all choices conceal a false binary, can sincerely choose postmodern faith and ask his readers to follow suit. Does not Caputo’s postmodern insistence that objective truth is impossible have the capacity to become just as dogmatic and harmful to a possible future as the fundamentalist’s strongly-gripped Bible? Caputo, in his mocking analysis of fundamentalism and earnest appeal for a postmodern faith, certainly shows that it can be just as normative and judgmental!

Can Caputo’s postmodern faith lead to an ethical life, that is (to use Spinoza’s definition of ethics), a happy life? This question seems the most pertinent. Caputo’s collapse of all motivating utopias or possibilities of collective action into “undecidability” has the troubling capacity to pave the way for the unabated continuance of state power and world capitalism. In the final analysis, neither fundamentalism nor postmodernism can be a site for mourning or celebration but must instead be understood as concrete challenges or obstacles on the path to a better world.