July 3, 2012

The Fragile Ethics of Testimony (Part 7/10)


IV.4
Giorgio Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz

It is difficult to understand precisely what point Agamben is trying to prove here. To elucidate Agamben’s argument, then, it is useful to note that the four modalities of Being can be represented with a semiotic diagram[i] that illustrates their structural-linguistic relationship.



“The subject,” it turns out, “is a field of forces always already traversed by the incandescent and historically determined currents of potentiality and impotentiality, of being able to be and not being able to be.”[ii] Until the advent of the camp, these processes were held in more-or-less stable alignment. However, in Agamben’s analysis, the fragile balance of these four modalities is shifted decisively in the space of the camp in such a way that impossibility subordinates possibility and necessity subordinates contingency. The resultant “catastrophe of the subject”[iii] reaches its nadir in Auschwitz’s production of the Muselmann.



It is therefore necessary for testimony to offer a way out of this violent rupture between subjectification and desubjectification, whose warping of the modal categories remains, according to Agamben, a working model for government today. Testimony, however, does not simply allow the subject to return to the original alignment of modalities; rather, it represents a total break from the modalities, generated through the structure and content of testimony.[iv]


Agamben explains, “In the Muselmann, biopower sought to produce its final secret: a survival separated from every possibility of testimony, a kind of absolute biopolitical substance that, in its isolation, allows for the attribution of demographic, ethnic, national, and political identity… With its every word, testimony refutes precisely this isolation of survival from life.”[v] Thus, testimony allows him to conclude with a fragile imperative to bear witness to the inhuman within oneself, so that the two can never be separated again.

By way of conclusion, Agamben then notes that the witness is comparable to the messianic concept of the “remnant”: “So the remnants of Auschwitz—the witnesses—are neither the dead nor the survivors, neither the drowned nor the saved. They are what remains between them.”[vi] This statement is a deliberate reference to a passage from Paul’s Letter to the Romans that, appropriately enough, serves as an epigraph for the book: “Even so then at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace….and so all Israel shall be saved” (Rom 11:5, 26).


[i] See Algirdas Julien Greimas, Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method, trans. Daniele McDowell, Ronald Schleifer, and Alan Velie (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). See also the cogent discussion in Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), 46-49, 82-83, 165-169, 253-257.

[ii] Agamben, Remnants,147-148.

[iii] Ibid., 148.

[iv] For this imaginative graphic arrangement, I am indebted to the novel use of the Semiotic Square in Davina C. Lopez, Apostle to the Conquered: Reimagining Paul’s Mission (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), see esp. 147-152.

[v] Agamben, Remnants, 156-157.

[vi] Ibid., 164.