[A short essay for a class on modern China.]
The discourse on Manchu and Han relations during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) tends to focus erroneously on the issue of identity. Historians like Ho Ping-ti accept the conventional thesis that the Qing Dynasty’s success was borne of the Manchu government’s capacity to adopt Han cultural norms, while historians like Evelyn Rawski argue for a reappraisal of history that instead focuses on the ability of the Manchu rulers to establish bonds and build bridges with non-Han ethnic minorities (Rawski 831). However, both Ho and Rawski assume, albeit in contrasting fashion, the preeminence of cultural identity in their history, an assumption that calls their conclusions into question. This essay, on the other hand, will argue that an entirely different understanding of Manchu rule will be necessary to appreciate this history, an understanding that deemphasizes the role of identity and ethnicity to instead stress the effects of ideology in constructing identity and creating history.
First, I want to reexamine the debate of sinicization with this guiding hermeneutic, using texts by Rawski and R. Keith Schoppa to show the limitations in the current orientation of scholarly discourse. In rehearsing the traditional analysis of the Qing Dynasty, Rawski quotes Ho: “The key to its [Qing] success was the adoption by early Manchu rulers of a policy of systematic sinicization” (831). In other words, it is necessary that Manchu identity be replaced, at least at the political level, by Han identity, for otherwise the political achievements of the Qing rulers would be impossible for contemporary scholars to explain. However, this argument, seemingly borne not out of necessity but in fact only out of a poor imagination, leads to absurd questions: how “Han” do Manchus have to act before they could be considered thoroughly sinicized? What made the Manchu’s sinicization “systematic”? Was the sinicization process a gradual shift in identity or a sudden, epiphanic moment of Han-realization? Rawski and Schoppa naturally try to distance themselves from the intellectual poverty of Ho’s sinicization thesis, and they develop a new way to think about identity: Schoppa argues that identity is constructed through historical processes, and as such identity is constantly shifting (4-6), while Rawski concludes with an exhortation for scholars to delve into the very heart of Chinese identity to discover the influences of non-Han culture (842). Therefore, Han identity and Manchu identity, far from being sui generis, can be (and, according to Rawski, must be) deconstructed by historians. But in the process of deconstruction, a crucial distinction needs to be made: what social or political behavior could be intrinsically attached to Han identity as opposed to Han ideology?
It is tempting to consider identity and ideology as synonymous, but a clear distinction must be drawn between the two. Indeed, Rawski and Schoppa both seem to have a modicum of confusion about the two terms. Rawski writes about ideology, but only briefly, for she argues, “The ideologies created by the Manchu leaders drew on Han and non-Han sources” (834). However, Rawski then quickly returns to her discourse on ethnic identity, almost as if to suggest that the terms “identity” and “ideology” could be used interchangeably, even though they are two markedly different categories that deserve a more careful differentiation than Rawski is willing to provide. While describing the lengths to which the Manchu rulers went to preserve their identity, Schoppa commits an equally disconcerting juxtaposition, in one paragraph writing, “A key to upholding Manchu martial identity was to maintain the banner forces, the vehicles of their military success,” while in the very next paragraph writing, “Yet another strategy for maintaining martial values was to set aside Manchuria as a permanent Manchu homeland” (28; emphasis mine). To vary his word choice, Schoppa sacrifices both clarity and precision. What, then, is the distinction between identity on the one hand and ideology and values on the other? Identity is a person or group’s self-image; values or ideologies constitute a person or group’s vision of (and for) reality. Why does identity, which is internalized and difficult to articulate, find its way to the center of this discussion, when ideology is the force that enacts dominance and shapes history and even creates a shared sense of identity? Ideology is the more compelling explanation for the Manchu’s successful rule during the Qing Dynasty.
What practical applications does this alternative view offer to the current debate? To answer this question, I want to review two of the concluding points Rawski leaves her readers with at the end of her essay to show how a focus on ideology could allow scholars fresh ways to answer her questions while pursuing a deeper inquiry into history. First, Rawski points out, “Only a definition of the nation that transcends Han identity can thus legitimately lay claim to the peripheral regions inhabited by non-Han peoples…” (841). More than that, since a person or group’s identity is authored by the same ideologies that construct the nation, a good definition of the nation must transcend the concept of identity at all. If we define “nation” as an ideological construct, this would also allow scholars to “reevaluate the historical contributions of the many peoples who have resided in and sometimes ruled over what is today Chinese territory” (842), for scholars could then deconstruct the biases in the way “China” is customarily defined. Second and connected to this, Rawski suggests in her conclusion that Han nationalism, a construct of the twentieth century, has played a large role in the interpretation of Chinese history (842). Focusing on ideology would allow scholars to deconstruct such erroneous interpretations of history and more accurately trace the developments of this particular kind of modern myth making.
Recognizing the artificial nature of identity must be coupled with a shift away from the focus on ethnic and cultural difference. Identity, since it is largely conditioned by the historical processes that are themselves intricately connected to ideology, should not be seen as the driving force of history; rather, a careful cartography of Manchu political and social ideology has the capacity to explain the efficacy of Manchu rule during the Qing Dynasty. Therefore, the task now facing researchers is a thorough inquiry into the structures of power that authorize identity as well as the particular notions of history that have come into debate; concomitantly, identity must be thought of as the product of those relations of power.
References
Rawski, Evelyn. “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, no.4 (November 1996): 829-850.
Schoppa, R. Keith. Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2011.
